Security Controls Reference
This page lists the controls HYPR AgentPass™ enforces on agent traffic, written for a security reviewer or auditor. Each row makes one claim: what the gateway does, the risk it answers, and the page that documents the behavior. Most claims link to the page that documents them. The rest name your HYPR representative as the source to confirm with.
The sections follow the questions a reviewer asks of an agent gateway:
- What an agent may do
- How an agent is stopped
- How one context is kept from another
- How instructions and secrets are protected
- How access is confirmed over time
- How sensitive data is handled
- How restrictions follow data from one call to the next
- What happens to information an agent retrieves
Where a control reaches the edge of what the gateway can see, the row says so instead of claiming more.
Agent Privileges
| Control | What it prevents | How AgentPass does it | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|---|
| AP-PRIV-1 — Authorization is decided by people, in the console | An agent's permissions being set anywhere other than by an administrator, or changing without a record | Allow, block and require-approval policies, and the per-role tool grants, are written by administrators in the console — itself governed by roles. The gateway enforces only what the console holds, and the policy list records how each rule was authored | Policies · Roles and Permissions · Controlling MCP Tool Access by Role |
| AP-PRIV-2 — A blocked action stops at the gateway | A denied action reaching the tool or the model anyway | Every tool call and every model request is checked against your policies before it is forwarded. A block ends the request at the gateway; nothing reaches the target | How Policies Are Evaluated · Governing Inference Traffic |
| AP-PRIV-3 — Tool access is closed by default | An agent calling — or even discovering — a tool its role was never granted | A tool not granted to the supervisor's role is neither listed to the agent nor callable. The list and the call check read the same decision, so they cannot disagree, and a newly discovered tool starts with no access | Controlling MCP Tool Access by Role |
| AP-PRIV-4 — An agent cannot administer the gateway | An agent using its own credential to change policies, roles, or its own permissions | An agent's credential opens only the connector endpoints it was given. The console accepts only a signed-in person's identity, and a service agent can never be issued the administrator role | Signing In to the Console · Creating a Service Agent |
| AP-PRIV-5 — A service agent's reach is its own, named boundary | An unattended agent inheriting the access of the person who set it up | A service agent's own role — not its owner's — decides its tools, and the connectors named on its credential, matched exactly, decide where that credential is accepted. Anything else is refused | Service Agents · Creating a Service Agent |
| AP-PRIV-6 — Revocation is immediate, everywhere | A disabled agent or a withdrawn grant continuing to work while a change propagates | Every gate re-reads the agent's status and grants on each request, on every gateway node. The next request after a change sees the change | Managing Service Agent Credentials · Roles and Permissions · Managed Cloud Agents |
| AP-PRIV-7 — A privileged action needs a person, on their own device | A sensitive action proceeding without a verifiable human decision | A require-approval policy holds the call until a supervisor approves it, on their phone or in the console. With Require signed approvals set to Required (production), every approval must be signed with that supervisor's own passkey, so the record shows the decision was theirs. Under Optional (soak), which a new organization starts on, an approval can be recorded without a signature | Approving and Denying Agent Actions · Setting Up Your Approval Passkey |
| AP-PRIV-8 — A shared agent acts as the person using it | One person's tool call running with another person's access | With per-user isolation on, each call an AWS Bedrock AgentCore agent makes runs as the person in that session — their connected accounts, their consents, their approvals — and only for that session. A call whose person cannot be determined is refused rather than run as anyone else | AWS Bedrock AgentCore Agents |
Stopping an Agent
| Control | What it prevents | How AgentPass does it | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|---|
| AP-KILL-1 — One switch stops any agent | Needing a different procedure for each kind of agent | The Enabled switch works the same way for Anthropic agents, AWS Bedrock AgentCore agents and service agents, from the same list | Managed Cloud Agents · Managing Service Agent Credentials |
| AP-KILL-2 — Disabling takes effect on the very next request | A disabled agent finishing "one more" call | A disabled agent's next call is refused at the gateway, whatever credential it presents. On an AWS Bedrock connector, that includes Observe only and Require Approval modes. In Disabled mode no caller is recorded, so there is no agent to refuse | Managed Cloud Agents · Managing Service Agent Credentials |
| AP-KILL-3 — It works across the whole deployment at once | A stop that reaches one gateway node before another | Agent status is read fresh on every request, on every node. Nothing is cached on that path, so there is no propagation to wait out and nothing to restart | Managing Service Agent Credentials · Managed Cloud Agents |
| AP-KILL-4 — Running work is interrupted | A disabled agent completing a session already in progress | Turning off an Anthropic cloud agent interrupts and archives its active sessions, so they cannot be resumed. Turning off an AWS Bedrock AgentCore agent stops its runtime sessions in AWS | Anthropic Cloud Agents · AWS Bedrock AgentCore Agents |
| AP-KILL-5 — Schedules do not fire for a stopped agent | An automation quietly running an agent that has been disabled or removed | A scheduled or triggered run against a disabled, archived or removed agent is recorded as skipped and never invokes the agent. A run in progress when the agent is turned off ends | Automating Cloud Agents |
| AP-KILL-6 — Offboarding a person revokes everything they held | A departed person's agents, sessions and connected accounts continuing to act | When an administrator offboards a person from the console, or your directory deprovisions them, every managed-agent credential issued to them, their running sessions, their connected-account tokens, and their group memberships and agent assignments are revoked at once | Supervisor Identity |
| AP-KILL-7 — Only an authorized person can flip the switch | An agent being disabled — or re-enabled — by someone outside its scope | Turning an agent off or on requires a console permission. At All scope it reaches every agent. At Own scope it turns off only the agents the person owns, and turns one back on only if that person turned it off. The rule is the same in the console and the mobile app | Roles and Permissions · Managed Cloud Agents · Approving and Denying Agent Actions |
| AP-KILL-8 — Every flip is attributable | Not knowing who stopped an agent | AgentPass records who disabled an agent and when, and shows it beside the switch on the agent's page while the agent is off. The reason given when turning off a cloud agent is recorded with it. Turning mobile access on or off, and offboarding a person, record who did it | Managed Cloud Agents |
| AP-KILL-9 — A whole organization can be contained | An incident that outgrows a single agent | A Platform Administrator can disable an entire organization, after which every request to that organization's gateway address is refused | Confirm with your HYPR representative |
| AP-KILL-10 — Detection has somewhere to go | Suspicious behavior being noticed with no way to act on it | Session Watch evaluators review sessions and report observations, and every policy block is recorded on the connector's Policies tab. Detection is observational — an administrator or supervisor disables the agent; nothing disables one automatically | Session Watch: Evaluator Agents · Writing a Policy by Hand · Approving and Denying Agent Actions |
Keeping Contexts Apart
| Control | What it prevents | How AgentPass does it | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|---|
| AP-ISO-1 — Every record belongs to exactly one organization | Data from one organization appearing in another | Everything AgentPass stores is scoped to the organization it belongs to, with no default organization to fall back to. A request to a gateway address that maps to no organization is refused | Data Management |
| AP-ISO-2 — Background work stays in its organization | Scheduled or deferred work losing track of which organization it serves | Work the gateway performs outside a request — retention sweeps, automation runs, deferred writes — carries its organization with it and cannot run without one | Confirm with your HYPR representative |
| AP-ISO-3 — Policies are per organization | One organization's rules acting on another's traffic | Policy evaluation is keyed by organization. Only your policies run on your traffic | Confirm with your HYPR representative |
| AP-ISO-4 — Connected accounts are personal | One person's connected account being used for another person's call | The tokens the gateway holds for a connector are stored per organization, per connector, per person, and never served across any of the three. Each person connects their own accounts, and an agent acts with that person's access | Connecting MCP Servers · Anthropic Cloud Agents |
| AP-ISO-5 — Nobody spends another person's account without an opt-in | A service agent quietly acting as its owner | A service agent does not use its owner's connected accounts unless an administrator names that connector on the credential. Without the opt-in, such a call is refused | Service Agents · Creating a Service Agent |
| AP-ISO-6 — An isolated call runs as its own person, or not at all | A shared cloud agent running a call under the wrong person's identity | On a per-user AWS Bedrock AgentCore agent, a session that is unknown, has ended, or belongs to another agent or another organization is refused, and the tool is never called | AWS Bedrock AgentCore Agents |
| AP-ISO-7 — A credential is good only where it was issued | An agent credential from one organization being accepted by another | A credential minted for one organization is refused at another organization's gateway address | Confirm with your HYPR representative |
| AP-ISO-8 — A cloud agent's credentials are bounded to its declared tools | An agent receiving a credential for a connector it was never given | Each person and agent pair holds its own credential store, and the agent's connector list bounds what that store may contain | Managed Cloud Agents · AWS Bedrock AgentCore Agents |
| AP-ISO-9 — Every call has exactly one agent and one person | Policy or audit acting on an ambiguous identity | The gateway resolves each request to one agent and one person — the person running the session first — before any policy runs, and that is all a policy sees. A gateway session credential is never forwarded to the target | Viewing the Request Log · Attribute Reference |
| AP-ISO-10 — Caches cannot mix organizations | Cached data serving the wrong organization | Cached data is kept separate per organization | Confirm with your HYPR representative |
| AP-ISO-11 — Captured samples never hold credentials | A secret surviving in the request record | Request and response samples are redacted before they are stored, and the raw view in the Request Log shows secrets redacted | Viewing the Request Log · Data Management |
| AP-ISO-12 — Persistent agent memory is governed at the configuration level | Unreviewed changes to what a cloud agent carries between sessions | AgentPass governs who may view or change an agent's configuration, memory settings included; the contents of that memory live with your provider and never pass through the gateway | AWS Bedrock AgentCore Agents · Managed Cloud Agents |
Protecting Instructions
| Control | What it prevents | How AgentPass does it | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|---|
| AP-PROMPT-1 — Reading an agent's instructions needs a grant; changing them needs a stronger one | A person viewing or rewriting an agent's prompt beyond their role | Viewing a cloud agent's configuration requires a view permission and changing it a manage permission. A permission held at Own scope reaches only the person's own agents | Managed Cloud Agents · Roles and Permissions |
| AP-PROMPT-2 — No agent-facing surface exposes configuration | An agent reading prompts, policies or connector settings through the gateway | The endpoints an agent can reach carry tools only. Prompts, policies and connector configuration are console-only, and no agent credential is a console identity | Signing In to the Console · Connecting a Service Agent |
| AP-PROMPT-3 — Tool routing is invisible | An agent learning which tools exist beyond its grant | The tool list handed to an agent is trimmed to what its role may call. Where a call is routed is decided at the gateway and never described to the agent | Controlling MCP Tool Access by Role |
| AP-PROMPT-4 — A refused call receives a verdict, never the rule | A blocked agent learning how a rule is built and working around it | A blocked agent receives the policy's name and the message you wrote; the condition itself never leaves the gateway. A tool refused by role is told only which tool was refused | How Policies Are Evaluated · Controlling MCP Tool Access by Role |
| AP-PROMPT-5 — Secrets are write-only and encrypted at rest | A connector secret being read back out of the console | Connector secrets and provider keys are stored encrypted and never shown again after saving. Changing one means replacing it | Anthropic Cloud Agents · Signing In to the Console |
| AP-PROMPT-6 — Secrets are attached per call, never shown to the agent | An agent, or the tool behind it, holding a credential it should never see | The gateway attaches the downstream credential at the moment it forwards a call. The agent never holds a credential of its own, and a gateway session credential is never passed to the target | Connecting MCP Servers |
| AP-PROMPT-7 — Execution records are console-only | An agent reading audit rows, policy verdicts or approval state | Request records, policy verdicts and approvals are read through the console under role scope, and samples are redacted before they are stored | Viewing the Request Log · Roles and Permissions · Data Management |
| AP-PROMPT-8 — Guidance AgentPass adds does not advertise privileged tools | The gateway's own instructions steering an agent toward a privileged action | The guidance AgentPass adds to a cloud agent's instructions explains how to behave when a call is held for approval. It does not list or promote privileged tools | Anthropic Cloud Agents · Managed Cloud Agents |
Agent Access Reviews
| Control | What it prevents | How AgentPass does it | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|---|
| AP-REVIEW-1 — Every agent has a recorded lifecycle stage | A retired agent quietly coming back into use, or a stage change nobody can explain | Each agent is in Production, Retain data only, or Retired. Leaving Production switches the agent off, and only a Production agent can be switched on again. Every change records who made it, when, and why | Lifecycle Stages |
| AP-REVIEW-2 — Reviews recur without anyone remembering to start them | Access going unreviewed because nobody opened a review | A schedule per stage opens a review on a set interval with no one acting. A new review opens only when the previous one for that stage is no longer open, so the same period is never reviewed twice | Set a Schedule |
| AP-REVIEW-3 — A review covers every agent in scope, once | An agent slipping through a review, or being decided twice | Every agent at the review's stages is included exactly once, and a person's desktop AI apps are one item. Retired agents are never included | Which Agents Are Reviewed |
| AP-REVIEW-4 — Nobody certifies their own agent | An owner approving their own agent's access, or a departed person deciding anything | An agent is never assigned to its owner. Only an active person who holds the review permission can review, and this is checked again at the moment of each decision | Who Can Do What |
| AP-REVIEW-5 — Decisions are made on the evidence | A reviewer approving access they cannot see | When a review opens, AgentPass takes a snapshot of each agent's reach per connector with its most sensitive data tier, who can use it, its credential facts, and its usage over 90 days. The reviewer decides on that snapshot | Read the Evidence |
| AP-REVIEW-6 — Each decision is recorded once, by the assigned reviewer | A decision that cannot be attributed, or a removal quietly reversed | Only the assigned reviewer can decide an agent, and each decision is recorded once with their name. A removal needs a reason, and a later Keep cannot undo it | Decide |
| AP-REVIEW-7 — A removal takes effect, or stays visible until it does | A reviewer's removal being recorded but never carried out | A removal is applied through the same controls an administrator uses. One that cannot be applied stays listed for the review's managers, with the reason, until it applies | Removals That Did Not Apply |
| AP-REVIEW-8 — People are told what they need to act on | A review stalling unnoticed, or an owner not knowing why access disappeared | Reviewers are reminded before the due date and after it until they finish. Managers are told about agents nobody can review and removals that did not apply. An agent's owner is told what was removed, by whom, and why | Notifications · What Managers Are Told |
| AP-REVIEW-9 — An undecided agent is never counted as approved | A review closing with gaps that read as approvals | Closing a review records every undecided agent as not reviewed | Close a Review |
| AP-REVIEW-10 — Results leave in a form an auditor can use | Review results that cannot be taken to an identity-governance tool, or an export that runs a formula | Each review exports as CSV or as JSON with the evidence, in fields that are added to but never renamed. Spreadsheet cells cannot start a formula, and every export is recorded | Export the Results |
| AP-REVIEW-11 — Running the program and reviewing are separate permissions | A reviewer changing schedules, or a manager deciding agents assigned to someone else | Setting schedules, opening and closing reviews, and exporting need the manage permission. The review permission reaches only the agents assigned to the person holding it | Who Can Do What |
| AP-REVIEW-12 — A reviewer is a named person, with one exception | A decision that cannot be tied to one individual | Every reviewer is a named person, except the recovery administrator while local sign-in is available: it is a shared break-glass account, so its decisions are recorded under that account and not tied to one person. This is where the control stops; to keep every decision tied to one person, name individual people as reviewers | The Recovery Administrator as a Reviewer |
Handling Sensitive Data
| Control | What it prevents | How AgentPass does it | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|---|
| AP-DATA-1 — Only approved tools run | An agent using a capability nobody reviewed | A tool discovered on an MCP server starts with no access; an administrator enables it and a role grants it. On a REST API connector every operation is available once the API is imported, so there the approval is importing the connector | Controlling MCP Tool Access by Role |
| AP-DATA-2 — A tool's data carries a classification policies can read | Rules that can only name tools, not the sensitivity of what they handle | Tiers and tags are assigned to tools, by name rule, or as a connector default, and reach every policy on every call to that tool | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-DATA-3 — A call is classified by what it carries | A sensitive payload passing through a tool nobody labeled | Optional detectors (card numbers, credentials, government identifiers) and your own dictionaries read a call's arguments and replies, and raise its classification | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-DATA-4 — Access above a tier can need a person's approval | Sensitive data reaching an agent without a human decision | A require-approval policy on the classification holds the call, and the approval the supervisor signs names the classification | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle · Approving and Denying Agent Actions |
| AP-DATA-5 — Access above a tier can be refused | An agent reaching data above what it should ever see | A block policy on the classification refuses the call before it is forwarded | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-DATA-6 — Unclassified traffic is not treated as sensitive, or as safe | A rule for sensitive data blocking everything — or being skipped — because a call carries no label | A call nothing classified carries no classification at all, so a rule written for classified data does not match it | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-DATA-7 — A classification cannot be lowered silently | Protection being reduced without anyone noticing | The highest matching label always wins; lowering one needs a written reason and is recorded; and a tier or tag cannot be removed from the vocabulary while anything still uses it | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-DATA-8 — Renaming a tier does not break rules | A rule quietly ceasing to match after the vocabulary is tidied up | Rules compare a tier's rank, and a tier's display name can change without touching its key | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-DATA-9 — Only authorized people change classifications | Someone who manages connectors also being able to declassify their data | Reading and changing labels and vocabulary are their own console permissions, separate from managing connectors | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-DATA-10 — An agent cannot change its own privileges | An agent granting itself access to more data | See AP-PRIV-4 | Signing In to the Console |
Carrying Restrictions Across Calls
| Control | What it prevents | How AgentPass does it | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|---|
| AP-FLOW-1 — Every hop is checked | Context moving between agents and tools without passing a boundary | Every call from an agent to a tool passes through the gateway, where organization and per-person boundaries are checked | See AP-ISO-1, AP-ISO-6, AP-ISO-9 |
| AP-FLOW-2 — A call's classification is recorded with it | Not being able to show what sensitivity of data a call moved | The request log records each call's classification, including one raised by what came back | Viewing the Request Log |
| AP-FLOW-3 — A destination is cleared only up to a level | Data reaching a system that should never receive it | A connector declares the most sensitive data it may receive. The ceiling alone refuses nothing: a flow policy compares each call with it, and holds or refuses a call above it before it is forwarded | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-FLOW-4 — Adopting a flow rule changes nothing until you set a ceiling | A new rule disrupting traffic before you have decided where data may go | A connector with no ceiling is never matched by a flow rule | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-FLOW-5 — What a session read follows it to its later calls | An agent reading sensitive data and sending a reworded version somewhere else | With session tracking on, the most sensitive data a session has read is carried to its later calls on any connector, so a send is judged on what the session read — not on its wording | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-FLOW-6 — Only data the agent actually received counts | A refused or failed call marking a session as sensitive | A call that was refused, held, or failed upstream leaves the session as it was | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-FLOW-7 — One session never inherits another's history | One person's reading affecting another person's actions | Sessions are kept apart per organization. Within one, a session is an AgentCore conversation, a cloud-agent session, an agent credential or a person. A person's desktop conversations share one record, and so do the sessions of one agent credential, kept separate per user on a shared AgentCore agent | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-FLOW-8 — A caller cannot reset its own session | An agent escaping its history by claiming a fresh session | Only identities the gateway verified decide the session; a cloud-agent session identifier counts only under that cloud agent's own credential | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-FLOW-9 — Out-of-scope context can be refused on the way back | A tool returning data the agent should not hold | A post-response policy reads the classification of what came back and can withhold the reply | Policy Attribute Reference |
| AP-FLOW-10 — An approver sees why a call was held | A supervisor approving blind | A held call's approval says what the session had already read | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-FLOW-11 — Every boundary crossing is recorded | Data leaving above a destination's clearance with no record — especially when nothing stopped it | Each crossing is recorded as an event with its outcome (allowed, denied or held) and counted in a daily report you can export | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-FLOW-12 — Session rules pause if the session record is unavailable | A storage fault blocking all traffic | Session rules depend on the session record. If it is unavailable, they do not apply | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-FLOW-13 — Desktop sessions are per person | — | Desktop clients such as Claude Code do not identify their sessions, so everything one person does within the idle window is one session. The recommended rule holds for approval rather than refusing for that reason | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
Handling Retrieved Information
| Control | What it prevents | How AgentPass does it | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|---|
| AP-RETRIEVE-1 — Every retrieval is attributed | Not knowing which agent, acting for whom, retrieved what | Each call is recorded with the agent, the person, the connector, the tool and a summary of its arguments | Viewing the Request Log |
| AP-RETRIEVE-2 — Combining sources cannot weaken a restriction | Restricted information being diluted into something that looks less sensitive | Within a session, the level only rises: whatever else a later call mixes in, it is judged at the most sensitive level the session read | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-RETRIEVE-3 — Lineage is per session, not per fact | — | The gateway knows that a session read restricted data, not which words in a later call came from it, and it cannot see information carried in a model's or provider's memory between sessions | Governing What a Session Has Already Read |
| AP-RETRIEVE-4 — Secrets are caught before they leave in a query | Credentials or regulated data being sent to an outside service inside a search or request | Detectors and your dictionaries read a call's arguments before it is forwarded, and a policy can refuse it | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-RETRIEVE-5 — A partly read payload is never reported as clean | A large payload being treated as safe because only its beginning was checked | When a payload is larger than the scan window, the result says so, and a policy can act on it | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-RETRIEVE-6 — The optional classifier never receives credentials | Secrets being sent to a third-party classification service | Credentials are removed before content is sent, and a value containing one withholds the call to the classifier entirely | Classifying the Data Your Tools Handle |
| AP-RETRIEVE-7 — Outbound searches are not yet anonymous | — | AgentPass removes the agent's credentials from forwarded calls, but it identifies your gateway to the destination and passes the client's own headers through. Searches that must not be attributable to your organization need an anonymizing egress in front of that connector | Confirm with your HYPR representative |